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AGGREGATION WITH SEQUENTIAL INDIVISIBLE AND CONTINUOUS LABOR SUPPLY 
DECISIONS AND AN INFORMAL SECTOR 
 
Aleksandar VASILEV  
Independent Researcher, Bulgaria 
alvasilev@yahoo.com 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract:  
The purpose of this paper is to explore the problem of non-convex labor supply decision in an economy with 
both discrete and continuous labor decisions. In contrast to the setup in Vasilev (2016a), here each household 
faces a sequential labor market choice - an indivisible labor supply choice in the market sector, and conditional on 
non-working in the official sector, a divisible hours choice in the informal sector. We show how lotteries as in 
Rogerson (1988) can again be used to convexify consumption sets, and aggregate over individual preferences. 
With a mix of sequential discrete and continuous labor supply decisions, aggregate disutility of non-market work 
becomes separable from market work, and the elasticity of the latter increases from unity to infinity.  
Keywords: Aggregation; Indivisible labour; Sequential Lotteries; Discrete-continuous mix; Informal economy; Non-
convexities  
JEL Classification: E1; J22; J46  
1. Introduction and Motivation 
The purpose of this paper is to explore the problem of non-convex labor supply decision in an economy with 
both discrete and continuous labor decisions, and explicitly perform the aggregation presented in Vasilev (2015a) 
without a formal proof, and thus provide - starting from micro-foundations - the derivation of the expected utility 
functions used for the aggregate household. In contrast to the setup in Vasilev (2016a), here each household faces 
a sequential labor market choice - an indivisible labor supply choice in the market sector, and conditional on non-
working in the official sector, a divisible hours choice in the informal sector. Such a modelling choice is along the 
lines of Vasilev (2016b, 2016c). The novelty relative to those studies is that the earlier setups were dealing with 
private-public sector and full-time work vs. overtime, respectively, while here the focus is on the market vs unofficial 
work margin. In this paper, we show how lotteries as in Rogerson (1988) can still be used to convexify consumption 
sets, and aggregate over individual preferences. With a mix of sequential discrete and continuous labor supply 
decisions, aggregate disutility from informal sector work becomes separable from market work, and the elasticity 
of the latter increases from unity to infinity 
2. Model Setup 
The theoretical setup follows to a great extent Vasilev (2015a). The economy is static, there is no physical 
capital, and agents face a sequential convex decision, followed by a continuous labor supply decision in a two-
sector economy. Since the focus is on a one-period world, the model abstracts away from technological progress, 
population growth and uncertainty. There is a large number of identical one-member households, indexed by i and 
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distributed uniformly on the [0,1] interval. In the exposition below, we will use small case letters to denote individual 
variables and suppress the index i to save on notation. 
2.1. Description of the Model 
Each household maximizes the following utility function:  
U(c,l)=lnc+lnl,   (1) 
where c denotes consumption of market output, l is the leisure enjoyed by each individual household, and 
>0 is the relative weight attached to utility of leisure. Each household is endowed with a time endowment of unity, 
which can be split between hours worked in either the official sector, hm, hours worked in the informal economy 
("black market"), hb, and leisure l, so that  
hm+hb+l=1   (2) 
The households make a sequential labor supply choice: The first is whether to work full-time in the market 
sector, or not at all. In other words,  0;mh h . Conditional on not working in the market sector, a household 
may decide to go and work in the grey sector, where it can supply any number of hours, i.e. h
b
[0,1] . That 
is, the first labor choice is indivisible, while the second is divisible. Also, it will be assumed that hb=0 whenever 
mh h , or a household employed full-time in the market sector would choose not to supply any hours in the grey 
economy. This assumption is put in place to guarantee that each worker can only participate in one of the production 
sectors. Next, the hourly wage rate in the official ("market") sector and the implicit rate in the informal economy 
("black market") sectors are denoted by wm and wb, respectively. Finally, the households own the firm in the market 
economy, and are entitled an equal share of the profit (). 
The problem faced by a household that decides to work full-time in the market sector is then to set mh h
and enjoy  
ln( ) ln(1 ),m mU w h h         (3) 
while a household that decides not to work in the market sector chooses  0,1bh  to maximize its utility 
function  
max
h
b
Ub=ln(wbh
b
+)+ln(1h
b
)      (4) 
The optimal labor choice in the grey economy is then characterized by the following first-order condition:  
wb
wbh
b
+
= 

1h
b
,         (5) 
or  
h
b
= 
wb
(1+)wb
         (6) 
That is, optimal choice of hours worked in the informal economy is a function of both the wage and profit 
rate in the official sector, which the household takes as given (and which in equilibrium would depend on the 
aggregate hours supplied to the firm operating in the market sector; therefore, non-market hours are a function of 
total market hours). 
2.2. Stand-in firm: market sector 
There is a representative firm in the model economy, which operates in the market sector. It produces a 
homogeneous final product using a production function that requires labor Hm as the only input. For simplicity, 
output price will be normalized to unity. The production function f(Hm) features decreasing returns to scale: 
/ / ( ) 0mf H  , 
/ ( ) 0mf H  , 
/ (0)f   , / ( ) 0f h  . The representative firm acts competitively by taking 
the wage rate w as given and chooses Hm to maximize profit:  
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=f(H
m
)wmH
m
 s.t. 0 mH h  .  (7) 
In equilibrium, there will be positive profit, which follows from the assumptions imposed on the production 
function. 
2.3. Stand-in firm: unofficial sector 
Each worker in the unofficial sector has access to an individual concave production function ("backyard 
technology") that uses only labor, g(hb), where g'(hb)>0, g''(hb)<0, g'(0)=, g'(1)=0. Each firm in the unofficial 
sector will then hire labor hb in every period to maximize static profit  
max
h
b
g(h
b
)wbh
b
 s.t.  0h
b
1.   (8) 
With free entry, there are zero profits in the sector, hence the implicit wage wb in the unofficial sector equals 
the average product of labor, i.e.  
wb= 
g(hb)
hb
.     (9) 
2.4. Decentralized competitive equilibrium (DCE): Definition  
A DCE is defined by allocations {cm,cb,hm,hb}, wage rates {w,w
b} , and aggregate profit (=) s.t. (1) 
all households maximize utility; (2) the stand-in firm in the unofficial sector maximizes profit; (3) the implicit wage 
rate in the unofficial sector is such that profits in the grey economy are zero; (4) all markets clear. 
3. Characterization the DCE and derivation of the aggregate utility function 
It will be shown that in the DCE, if it exists, only some of the households will be employed in the official 
sector and work full-time, while the rest will fo to the unofficial sector and chose how many hours to work. Following 
the arguments in Rogerson (1988) and Hansen (1985), it can be easily shown that polar cases in which each 
household either works in the official, or in the unofficial sector, cannot not be equilibrium outcomes. Therefore, it 
must be the case that a proportion of the agents in the economy are working in the unofficial sector, while the rest 
will be supplying labor services in the official sector. Denote this mass of officially employed by , and the officially 
unemployed by 1. Workers in the official sector will receive consumption cm, while those working in the unofficial 
sector will consume cb. Note that can be interpreted also as the probability of being chosen to work in the 
unofficial sector: This probability is determined endogenously in the model, as workers would seek for the optimal 
balance between the net return from working across the sectors (at the margin). No matter of the employment 
outcome in the market sector, ex post every household enjoys the same utility level. Thus, in equilibrium  
mH h . From the firm’s point of view then the market wage is set equal to:  
/ ( )mw f h     (10) 
Firm’s profit is then  
/( ) ( ) 0f h f h h        ,    (11) 
which follows from the dreasing returns to scale featured by the production function. Next, to show that the 
DCE actually exists, it is sufficient to show the existence of a fixed point (0,1) by analyzing a non-linear 
equation using the fact that in equilibrium utility is the same for all households. Note that from the result that grey-
sector hours are a function of total market hours, it follows now that unofficial hours are a function of the proportion 
of households employed in the market sector (since h  is now a parameter). Furthermore, using the Implicit 
Function Theorem on the first-order condition for hn, we can show dhn/d>0, which follows from the 
complementarity between the two types of income: from labor in the unofficial sector, and the capital income from 
the claim on profits. In other words, the more people work in the official sector, the lower the profits are; profit is 
zero if everyone works in the market sector. This in turn stimulates the household to work more in the unofficial 
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sector in order to increase total income and achieve higher consumption in the household’s utility function (while 
also trying not to decrease utility from leisure that much). 
It is trivial to show that everyone working in the market sector (=1) is not an equilibrium, since thenwm=0. 
From the ex-ante symmetry assumption for households, market consumption would be the same for both market 
workers and those not selected for work in the official sector, while the latter would enjoy higher utility out of leisure 
(holding hm fixed), hence there is no benefit of working. Similarly, nobody working in the market sector (=0) is not 
an equilibrium outcome either, since the firm would then offer a very high wage for the first unit of labor, and by 
taking a full-time job a marginal worker could increase his/her utility a lot. 
Thus, if there is a DCE, then it must be that not all households would receive the same consumption bundle. 
If (0,1) is an equilibrium, then total utility for households that work in the market sector should equal to the 
utility of households that do not supply any hours in the market sector. This equation is monotone in , as the utility 
function is a sum of monotone functions, and the h
b
() term is quantitatively small. Thus, we can explore the 
behavior of that function (the difference between the utility of working in the market sector and working in the grey 
economy) as we let vary in the (0,1) interval. As 0, the left-hand-side dominates (utility of working is higher), 
while when 1 the right-hand-side dominates (utility of not working is higher), where the results follow from the 
concavity of the utility functions and the production technologies. In addition, from the continuity of those functions, 
0,1), which is consistent with equilibrium. The unique value of  follows from the monotonicity of the utility 
and production functions. Let 
*
mc  and 
*
bc  denote equilibrium consumption allocations of individuals selected for 
work in the market sector, and those who will work in the informal sector. 
Given the indivisibility of the labor supply in the market sector, the equilibrium allocation obtained above is 
not Pareto optimal, as demonstrated in Rogerson (1988). More specifically, a social planner (SP) could make 
everyone better off by using an employment lottery in the first stage and choosing the fraction  of individual 
households to work in the market sector and give everyone consumption 
* *(1 )m bc c   . In order to show this, 
we need to check that such an allocation is feasible, and that it provides a higher level of total utility. Showing 
feasibility is trivial as total market labor input and total consumption are identical to the corresponding individual 
equilibrium values. 
Next, we will show that the new allocation, which is independent of household’s employment status in the 
market sector, makes households better off since it generates higher utility on average. This is indeed the case, 
where the strict inequality follows from the convexity of the CES aggregation and the concavity of the logarithmic 
function. Thus, the SP is indeed giving in expected utility terms an allocation that is an improvement over the initial 
equilibrium allocation. If households can pool income together and doing so, they will be able to equalize 
consumption across states, i.e, 
* *
m bc c c  . Substituting the expressions for consumption and total hours in the 
aggregate utility and rearranging terms yields  
lnc+AH
m
+Bln(1h
b
).    (12) 
where A >0 and B>0 are functions of model parameters. The resulting aggregate utility function is of an interesting 
and novel form. On the aggregate, when each household faces a sequence of indivisible and divisible labor choices, 
the representative agent obtained from the aggregation features different preferences of work: as in Vasilev (2016a) 
with home production, the disutility of work in the market sector is now linear, while the disutility of labor in the 
informal sector hb is logarithmic as in the individual utility function, built separated from market hours. The split of 
the two types of labor is driven by the fact that market labor was indivisible, while hours supplied in the informal 
sector were divisible. In addition, the sequential discrete-continuous labor supply decision could be quantitatively 
important for the transmission of business cycle shocks and welfare effects of different government policies. 
However, such investigations are left beyond the scope of this note. In general, in terms of moment matching at 
business-cycle frequencies, models with indivisible market hours, e.g. the original Hansen (1985) and Vasilev 
(2015c) with home production sector, are an improvement over identical models with divisible labor supply in the 
official sector. Therefore, the model could be useful to policymakers interested in implementing labor policies in 
countries with large informal sectors. 
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Conclusions 
This paper explored the problem of non-convex labor supply decision in an economy with both discrete and 
continuous labor decisions. In contrast to the setup in Vasilev (2016a), here each household faces a sequential 
labor market choice - an indivisible labor supply choice in the market sector, and a divisible hours choice in the 
informal sector. The novelty was that the aggregated utility function produced interesting non-linearities that were 
not present at individual level. With a mix of sequential discrete and continuous labor supply decisions, the disutility 
from informal sector hours work becomes separable from official sector hours, and the elasticity of the latter 
increases from unity to infinity.  
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